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Making the public sector more efficient is one of the most formidable challenges faced by
policy makers all over the world. In the case of developing countries, the significance of
this challenge is revealed by the sectoral distribution of World Bank credits and loans.' In
the fiscal year 2000, public sector reform was the most important sector of lending,
amounting to almost 1.9 billion dollars, out of a total of roughly 15.3 billion. Lending for
public sector reform exceeded the combined lending for education and the environment.
It also exceeded the combined lending for water supply, sanitation,  population, nutrition
and health programs. And it was bigger than lending for social protection, which was at
one of its highest levels in World Bank history. The only sector that came close to public
sector reform was finance. But this is hardly surprising in the aftermath of the East Asian
crisis, when many commercial banks still needed to be re-capitalized.
As the wage bill is the largest item in public sector spending, reforming the public
sector usually entails changes in employment and pay. This is a socially and politically
charged issue. Public sector workers are among the most vocal and influential interest
groups in any society. Policy measures that affect them adversely are often met by strong
resistance, derailing reform programs and causing governments to fall. Typically, public
sector.workers claim that they are underpaid compared to their private sector
counterparts, argue that low pay is at the root of inefficiency and corruption, and try to re-
orient public sector reform in the direction of pay raises. That specific groups of public
sector workers (especially at the professional and managerial levels) may be underpaid is
not questioned. However, the very fact that most public sector workers are unwilling to
leave their jobs, except in exchange for generous compensation, suggests that
overpayment is also common.
I Throughout  the paper,  the expression  "developing  countries"  is meant  to include  transition
economies  as well.  These  countries  and economies  may differ  in their output  per capita,  but one  of the key
features  they  have  in common  is the sizeable  portion  of the labor  force  that  is self-employed  or not subject
to labor  market  regulations.
IThe absence of reliable information on the gap between public and private sector
pay may increase the leverage of interest groups to influence government decisions
regarding public sector pay. This lack of information is also a hindrance when designing
downsizing programs. Compensation packages for redundant workers tend to be set up in
ad hoc ways. Typically, some rule of thumb involving salary and seniority in the public
sector is used, but the resulting amount of compensation bears no relationship with the
present value of the loss in earnings and benefits from job separation. While many
separated workers have been under-compensated, some of the separation packages used
in developing countries could easily qualify as "golden handshakes" (Kikeri, 1997).
Downsizing programs supported by the World Bank are not an exception in this respect
(Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999).
Unfortunately, the method that is most frequently used to estimate the gap
between public and private sector pay is bound to produce biased results in developing
countries. This method, called "the jobs approach" in what follows, focuses on the
salaries of a set of private sector jobs whose description is similar to that of public sector
jobs. A usual version of the jobs approach is the "Hays points" system used by many
large organizations (including, until quite recently, the World Bank itself) to set their
compensation levels. The problem when applying this approach to developing countries
is that comparable  jobs are mainly or exclusively found in formal sector enterprises. Jobs
of this sort might be the relevant alternative for public sector workers at the professional
and managerial levels. However, tracer studies of separated public sector workers suggest
that the relevant alternative for the rank-and-file is self-employment, or casual work in
informal activities, including agriculture (Alderman et al., 1996, Rama and MacIsaac,
1999).  As salaried jobs in formal sector enterprises are among the best in a developing
country, the jobs approach overestimates the extent to which public sector workers are
underpaid, or underestimates the extent to which they are overpaid. Despite its obvious
bias, this approach is often used in World Bank-supported reform programs.
The alternative is to compare the earnings of public sector workers to those of
similar workers in the private sector, regardless of whether they are employed in the
formal or the informal sector of the economy. This method is called "the workers
approach" in what follows. One potential problem with the workers approach is that
2individuals may be similar along some observable dimensions (e.g., gender, age or
educational attainment) but different in more subtle ways. For instance, public sector
workers could be more talented, or less ambitious, or better connected, than their private
sector counterparts. Comparing the earnings of a public sector worker to those of an
apparently similar private sector worker may thus be misleading. What needs to be
evaluated is the earnings a public sector worker would have if he or she were to move to
the private sector, taking into account his or her talent, ambition or connections. But
those earnings are unobservable. By ignoring relevant unobservable characteristics, the
workers approach could therefore lead to results that are as biased as those obtained with
the jobs approach, except that the direction of the bias is unknown a priori.
The goal of this paper is to assess whether the bias created by unobservable
individual characteristics, also known as selection bias, is substantial enough to invalidate
the workers approach. For this assessment to be credible, it has to focus on a country that
satisfies two criteria. First, its database has to be good enough to credibly measure the
gap in earnings and benefits between the public and the private sector, "corrected" for the
effect of unobservable individual characteristics. The availability of a nationally
representative household survey with a panel structure over time is the ideal in this
respect. Second, there has to be a strong presumption that recruitment into the public
sector, and separation from it, is influenced by unobservable individual characteristics
that influence private sector earnings. If, say, recruitment were strictly based on
educational attainment, it would not be surprising to find that the selection bias is
negligible. But this finding would be irrelevant for other, less meritocratic countries.
Vietnam meets these two criteria. As regards the public sector, it was government
policy to use jobs in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as an income transfer. In principle,
some of these jobs were to be considered as a reward for political loyalty or a
compensation for sacrifices incurred during independence wars. In practice, many of
them were allocated based on connections. Presumably, those who got the jobs would
have had lower eamings in the private sector. But political loyalty, war-related losses or
connections are not measurable. More recently, SOEs were subject to a massive
downsizing program that led to the separation of roughly one third of their workforce in
the early 1990s, partly on a voluntary basis. Those who remained were probably less
3entrepreneurial, and had worse earnings opportunities in the private sector. Again, the
entrepreneurial spirit is not measurable. Because of the role played by unobservable
characteristics in both recruitment and separations, the selection bias could be
considerable when estimating the potential earnings of SOE workers in the private sector.
Concerning the data, Vietnam has a high-quality, nationally representative survey
with a panel structure, known as the VLSS (for Vietnam Living Standards Survey). The
VLSS reports detailed information on sector of employment and eamings, including a
vast array of benefits and payments in kind, for a large sample of workers. It was carried
out in 1992-1993 and in 1997-1998, and a substantial fraction of the workers was
interviewed in both rounds. Because the public sector of Vietnam stills employ a non-
negligible portion of the labor force, in each of the two rounds of the VLSS it is possible
to find hundreds of workers whose main occupation is in an SOE. The panel nature of the
VLSS also makes it possible to "remove" the effect of unobservable characteristics, by
focusing on the change in earnings experienced by individuals who moved from SOEs to
the private sector, or vice-versa. But panel data analysis is only one among several
econometric techniques that can be applied to VLSS data to correct for the effects of
selection bias.
Our paper is certainly not the first one to use the workers approach, or to
explicitly assess the impact of selection bias on the earnings gap between the public and
the private sectors in a developing country. To our knowledge, studies along similar lines
exist for Cote d'Ivoire (van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988), Ethiopia (Mengistae, 1998),
Haiti (Terrell, 1993), India (Lakshmanasamy and Ramasamy, 1999), Indonesia (Filmer
and Lindauer, 2001), Peru (Stelcner et al., 1989), Poland (Adamchik and Beri, 2000),
Taiwan (Hou, 1993) and Tanzania (Lindauer and Sabot, 1983). Another study uses the
workers approach to estimate the earnings gap for a specific group of public sector
workers, namely teachers, across a dozen Latin American countries (Psacharopoulos et
al., 1996).
However, our paper differs from previous studies in several, important ways.
First, it focuses on the entire distribution of the earnings gap, and not only on its
"average" size. Second, rather than choosing one method to correct for the selection bias,
4it relies on a broad array of empirical strategies. A valid criticism of all the methods used
to correct for the effect of unobservable individual characteristics is that they require
strong assumptions. By comparing the results obtained with alternative  methods, hence
under alternative assumptions, this paper implicitly evaluates the robustness of the
estimated distribution of earnings gaps. Third, the paper also compares the results
obtained with the workers approach to those obtained with the jobs approach. This
comparison reveals how misleading the latter can be.
2.  State-Owned Enterprises in Vietnam
Although the public sector of Vietnam is not large compared to other transition
countries, it still plays a significant role in the economy. SOEs employ roughly five
percent of the labor force, but account for around a fifth of GDP. This higher productivity
is the result of a much higher capital intensity of production, which in turn may require
the use of relatively more qualified workers. Technology is only one among many
reasons why SOE workers differ from private sector workers. SOE workers are older on
average than private sector workers, as the public sector expanded in the times of central
planning, but has been shrinking since market-oriented reforms (or Doi Moi) began, in
the late 1980s.  As Vietnam is a young country, most of the.new entrants to the labor force
end up in the private sector. In a country that is still massively rural, SOE workers are
also more urban. And SOE workers are predominantly male, despite the fact that labor
force participation rates are similar for men and women in Vietnam. This male bias exists
not just compared to the private sector in general, but also compared to formal enterprises
in the private sector (MOLISA, 1998).
Public sector workers differ from private sector workers in more subtle ways too.
In Vietnam, it has been an explicit government policy to use SOE jobs as an income
transfer. Shortly after the French war, it was decided that "people to be recruited must be
from all sectors: northern, southern, female, male, with priority on recruiting people who
had been active or had achievements in the war and are working to build peace" (circular
8/LD-TT of August 1959; our translation). While skill levels were deemed important, the
required standards included "political quality, workers disposition [and] health", all
characteristics that might be difficult to measure using a household survey instrument.
5Political quality might have been especially relevant, as all large SOEs have a
Communist Party cell. One regulation explicitly stated that "recruitment for technical
training must be combined with arranging work for children and other relatives of
existing cadres, of soldiers, of war martyrs, of revolutionaries" (circular 2-LD/TT of
January 1960; our translation). This regulation also criticized the common practice of
"hiring friends and family without the necessary skills" (ibid.), which suggests that
connections were an important determinant of recruitment. Additional regulations giving
priority in recruitment to demobilized soldiers, war invalids and their families were
issued during the American war.
Another potential source of selection bias was the massive downsizing program of
the early 1  990s, when roughly one in three SOE workers left the state sector. By then, the
Doi Moi program had created a significant earnings potential in the informal sector. The
severance pay package offered to those resigning was not too large, but it was considered
sufficient to start a small household business. It would not be surprising if many among
the most entrepreneurial SOE workers had left at that time. The downsizing regulations
did not specify that separations had to be voluntary, but they gave considerable leeway
for SOEs to manage the process. Decision 176-HDBT, of October 1989, explicitly
encouraged the separation of "young workers who are healthy and have skills, if they
volunteer" (our translation). Admittedly, the share of female workers who lost their jobs
was disproportionately high, and this could be an indication that many separations were
involuntary (Rama, 2001). However, the downsizing program of the early 1990s would
be a potential source of selection bias as long as some of the separations were voluntary,
and many of them were.
Despite this massive downsizing, SOEs remain substantially over-staffed in
Vietnam. An analysis based on plant-level data suggests that as many as half of the
workers would be redundant if SOEs were to operate in the same way as fully private
enterprises (Belser and Rama, 2001). Redundancies are especially large in construction,
mining and transportation. They are smaller, or even negligible, in footwear, textile and
garments. When this paper was written, the government of Vietnam was initiating a new
phase of its reform program, geared towards the liquidation, privatization or restructuring
of several thousand SOEs. This new phase of the program could require one hundred
6thousand job separations per year, in addition to the "natural" attrition resulting from
retirement and contract expiration. Predicting the losses that SOE workers could
experience as a result of job separation is key to designing an appropriate compensation
and assistance scheme for them.
3.  The Jobs Approach
A common perception, after almost a decade of refonns, is that SOE workers are
underpaid compared to their private sector counterparts. According to a survey carried
out by the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor, "state economic units in Hanoi have
income on average of 450,000 dong per person per month; non-state economic entities:
500,000 dong per person per month; foreign invested enterprises: 90 US dollars
[equivalent to 993,000 dong] per person per month" (Labor; October 15, 1996, page 3;
our translation). Another study, by the Ministry of Education and Training concluded that
"'self-employed  workers have incomes 26 percent higher than state workers, people who
work in private companies have incomes 33 percent higher, and people working in
foreign companies have incomes 73 percent higher (Labor, 21 December, 1996, page 1;
our translation). Not surprisingly, university graduates are said to be lured into the private
sector to the detriment of SOEs. According to one report, "starting salaries of between
200 and 300 US dollars per month were on offer compared to only 20-50 dollars a month
in state-firms" (Courier du Vietnam;  May 30, 1997; our translation).
This perception is confirmed when the jobs approach is used to estimate the gap
in earnings between the public and the private sector in Vietnam, as shown by Table 1.
The first two data columns in this table report the average earnings, including benefits, of
workers in selected occupations according to individual records from the 1997-98 round
of the VLSS. The workers in the first data column are employed by SOEs; those in the
second data colunm have jobs in the private formal sector. For the purpose of this table, a
private sector  job is defined as formal if the firm has a personnel of ten or more and the
worker has a written contract.
The last two data columns in Table 1 report earnings for similar jobs with the
"best" employers in Vietnam, according to a study commissioned by the United Nations
7Development Program (UNDP). The employers considered include local subsidiaries of
firms such as Citibank and British Petroleum, among others. This study was aimed at
determining the appropriate pay level for local UNDP staff, not for public sector workers.
Still, the kind of pay study that would be carried out in the context of a public sector
reform program would probably be quite similar to the one commissioned by the UNDP.
The matching of occupations across the VLSS survey and the UNDP study is
probably not perfect. Several jobs had to be discarded, either because they were not
similar enough or because they included very few observations. Still, the picture that
emerges from Table 1 would not be substantially different under different matching
hypotheses.
According to Table 1, SOE workers are clearly underpaid. If the figures in this
table are to be taken literally, an office worker would earn more than twice as much in the
formal private sector, and five to six times as much with the "best" employers in
Vietnam. The gaps vary from occupation to occupation, but the basic conclusion holds. If
SOE wages were to be revised based on the jobs approach, the obvious recommendation
would be to raise them substantially. However, the difference in the size of the
recommended wage increase, depending on which comparator is used, casts doubts on
the reliability of this approach. If resources were not a constraint, should the wages of
office workers in SOEs be multiplied by a factor of two, or by a factor of six? In fact, the
workers approach suggests that both figures are wrong. But its implementation requires
some explanation.
4.  The Workers Approach
As a first approximation, the gap between the salary in the SOE and the
alternative labor earnings in the private sector can be estimated using a very simple
econometric model. Let Xi be a vector representing the observable characteristics of
worker 'i' (e.g., gender, educational attainment, work experience, etc.) and W 1 be the
labor earnings of this worker. The sector of employment can be captured by the indicator
variable Si, which is equal to one if worker 'i' is employed by an SOE and equal to zero
if he or she is in the private sector. The following relationship between individual
8characteristics and labor earnings can be assumed for those who work in the private
sector:
LogWi =a X Xi+ei  for Si=°  (1)
where £j is a stochastic disturbance with zero mean. This disturbance summarizes the
effects of unobservable individual characteristics, such as talent, political loyalty, war-
related losses, or connections. Assuming that Ej is not correlated with the unobservable
individual characteristics Xi, the parameters in vector ax can be estimated by ordinary
least squares.
The estimated parameters, identified in what follows by a hat, can in turn be used
to predict the earnings an SOE worker with individual characteristics Xi would have in
the private sector. More specifically, the gap between actual earnings in the SOE sector
and predicted earnings in the private sector can be defined as:
Rli  =  Log W. - acx  Xi  for Si =1  (2)
1
The gap in equation (2) is identified by the number one to indicate that it is
estimated with the first (and simplest) econometric model considered in this paper. For
relatively small values of this gap, Rl  can be interpreted as a percentage.
The model just described generates biased results when labor earnings are
affected by unobservable individual characteristics that are correlated with the sector of
employment. The switching regression model is one among several empirical strategies
to deal with this problem. This model assumes that the sector of employment is
determined as follows:
Si =AX Xi +,X  z Z+  77i  for alli  (3)
S.=1  if  S. >O
S. = 0 otherwise
In equation (3), Zi are individual characteristics that affect the latent variable S  *,
hence potentially the sector of employment, but not the level of earnings.
9The model is completed by two earnings equations, one for each sector:
LogW,  =  =  X  Xi +  Ifor  Si =  (4A)
LogWi  =Ys  X  +WS  for Si  =-1  (4B)
The disturbances wo 0
1 and csi are potentially correlated with the disturbance m1i  of
the underlying model for sector selection. In fact, the selection bias resulting from
unobservable individual characteristics is captured in this model through the correlation
between disturbances. For example, politically oriented individuals could be more likely
to work in the public sector, and to earn higher salaries in it, but be less productive in a
private sector  job. In this example, the correlation between ms  and (oS 1 would be positive,
whereas the correlation between  i and oo°  would be negative.
Assuming a joint normal distribution for all the disturbances, the system
represented by equations (3), (4A) and (4B) can be jointly estimated using the full-
information maximum likelihood method. This procedure yields unbiased values for
coefficients '*x,  ltz, yx and yz, as well as for the standard deviations a0 and as of
disturbances o  and  os. It also yields estimates for the correlation coefficients between T1
and cO),  and between  i and Cog,  called p 0 and ps.
The estimated parameters can be used to predict the earnings public sector
workers would have in the private sector, taking into account both their observable and
unobservable characteristics. The prediction involves the density function 0(. ) and the
accumulated  density  function  ID(.  ) of a normal  distribution,  evaluated  at
Ax  Xi + AZ Zi.  Let Oi and cp, be those values. The predicted gap in earnings can be
written as:
R2i  =Log W -yX  Xi  +PO  l>  for Si=  1  (5)
The interpretation of equation (5) is not straightforward. Consider again the case
where the relevant unobservable characteristic is political motivation, and the correlation
10coefficient  p  is negative. Consider also two SOE workers: one who was recruited
mainly because he or she had the right skills (education, experience, etc.) and one that
was recruited based on political considerations. The first, skilled worker, is characterized
by a high value of the latent variable S* and a high value of the ratio  z/(l - 1D).  For the
second, politically motivated worker, the ratio 4/(i - c>) is small. Because p°  is
negative (and  60 is positive), the last term in equation (5) is larger for the politically
motivated worker than for the skilled worker. Put differently, based on their unobservable
characteristics only, the politically motivated worker loses more if he or she has to move
to the private sector.
The next two models considered in this paper involve the use of panel data. Their
key assumption is that the effect of the relevant unobservable characteristics on earnings
can be found at least twice in the data. In the simplest case, the same individual is
observed at two points in time. The labor earnings of this individual can be seen as the
outcome of three different determinants: his or her observable individual characteristics,
the sector he or she works in, and his or her unobservable characteristics. The effect of
the latter, hereafter called vi, is supposed to be invariant over time and across sectors.
The resulting earnings equation is:
Log Wit  = °X x  Si  Sit  +  vi +  4,t  for all l  (6)
where the sub-index t indicates a point in time. Assume, for instance, that a more talented
individual eams more in both sectors. In that case, vi would be positive.
The availability of at least two observations for individual i makes it possible to
estimate all the coefficients in equation (6), including vi using panel data techniques,
such as fixed effects or random effects. Having estimated the impact of unobservable
characteristics on earnings, the gap between the SOE salary and private sector earnings
becomes:
R3it  =  Wit - 3x XI' - for Si
11In the example, a talented private sector worker would be characterized by a
positive value of v;, so that private sector earnings would be larger, and the earnings gap
smaller, than suggested by observable characteristics only.
The individual effects model is well suited to the case where the relevant
unobservable characteristics are indeed individual-specific.  However, the sector of
employment may also depend on unobservable characteristics  that are better seen as
household-specific, such as political loyalty, war-related losses or connections. In this
case, information on the earnings of two members of the same household can be used to
estimate the effect v&  of unobservable characteristics.  This model, labeled household
effects in what follows, leads to the following earnings equation:
Log W  =  opX  XXih  +  S  + Vh + 5ih  for all i and h  (8)
where the sub-index h identifies the household. For example, all working members of a
well-connected household could have higher earnings than suggested by their observable
characteristics only, both in the public sector and out of it. In that case, vh would be
positive, reflecting the premium to connections.
As before, all the coefficients in this equation, including v.,  can be estimated
using panel data techniques, such as random effects or fixed effects. Those coefficients
can in turn be used to predict the earnings gap as follows:
R4  =LogW  -ox  Xih -Vh  for S  =  (9) ih  ih  x  hh  ih
In the example, a member of a well-connected household who works in an SOE
would have a lower earnings gap than suggested by his or her individual characteristics
only, because connections would allow him or her to get a good job out of the public
sector.
The last model considered in this paper is based on a direct "matching" of public
and private sector workers. Unlike the previous models, this one does not attempt to
unveil the structure of private sector earnings. The comparison is directly between each
12public sector worker and one or several "similar" workers in the private sector, not
between a public sector worker and a point in a regression line. Predicting alternative
earnings based on a regression line is the same as setting the stochastic disturbance of the
earmings  equation equal to zero. But this assumption is not necessary with the matching
model. The best match for a public sector worker is a worker who, in general, has
earnings either above or below the regression line.
The only "structure" used by the matching model can be found in the mechanism
that deternines  the sector of employment, which is still supposed to be the one described
in equation (3). This equation is estimated using a Logit model, and the resulting
coefficients are used to measure the "distance" Dik between an individual j who works for
an SOE and an individual k who works in the private sector. This distance is defined as
the square of the difference between the predicted probabilities that these two individuals
would work for an SOE:
exp(fIX X.  + A  Z 3)  exp(,u  X  +  Zk) 1
D.  =  (I  J  _X  k  Zk(0) ik  1  + exp(Ax X  j +  ZZ)  1  + exp(Cix  Xk  +AZ Zk)J
Among all the k individuals who work in the private sector, individual n is
considered the best match for public sector worker i if Di, < Djk for all k ￿  n. In addition,
it is required that the predicted probability of working in an SOE be non-negligible, for
both individual i and individual k, and that the distance Din does not exceed some critical
threshold. With the matching approach, the gap in earnings is defined as:
R5h  =Log W.  - Log W  for Si=  (11)
This model can be easily extended so as to consider more than just one, best
match for each SOE worker. In this paper, the average earnings of the best three matches
for each SOE worker will be used as the appropriate W,.
The five models outlined in this section rely on different assumptions to estimate
the earnings gap between the public and the private sector. Moreover, as will be
discussed below, the sample of observations that can be used in each case is generally
different too. The five R indicators are thus the joint outcome of both different
13assumptions and different data sets. For instance, the ordinary least squares model does
not attempt to correct for the effects of the selection  bias, but it uses the largest number of
observations. On the other hand, the individual effects model provides a highly credible
way to "remove" the effect of unobservable characteristics,  but it can only be applied to
the fewer individuals whose earnings are observable at two points in time. Rather than
trying to argue in favor of one or the other of the R indicators, this paper compares the
results obtained with all five. This comparison is key to assess how sensitive the
predicted earnings gap is to the chosen econometric technique.
5.  Data
The data used in this paper are from the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys
(VLSS), collected by the General Statistical Office in Vietnam. The VLSS is a multi-
purpose instrument, in the spirit of the Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS)
set up in various developing countries with support from the World Bank (Glewwe and
Grosh, 1998). While one of the main objectives of these surveys is to estimate household
consumption, hence to measure poverty, the VLSS has an especially rich questionnaire
regarding individual employment and earnings. In addition, and unlike most surveys for
developing countries, the VLSS has a panel component, whereby information on a large
number of individuals is available at two points in time. The first VLSS survey was
implemented from October 1992 to October 1993, and the second one from December
1997 to December 1998.
For the first VLSS a sample of 4,800 households was selected using multi-stage
cluster sampling, stratified by urban and rural areas according to the 1989 population
census. The first stage of the sampling systematically selected 120 communes and 30
urban wards, out of all the communes and wards in the country, using a fixed household
interval. The second step randomly selected two villages within each of these communes
or wards, again in proportion to the number of households. Within each village, a
household list was prepared by commune authorities based on officially registered
households and 16 households were chosen, with an extra four as reserve in case a
household was unavailable or unwilling to be interviewed. The second VLSS had a
sample of 6,000 households, of which 4,305 were in the original 1992-93 sample. The
14remainder were chosen from the Multi-purpose  Household Survey (MPHS) and from
replacement households selected during the fieldwork. The second VLSS used a different
system of stratification based on three sizes of urban areas and the rural areas of the seven
regions that existed at the time of sample selection. Instead of choosing the sample to be
self-weighting, as in the first round, smaller regions were over-sampled to guarantee a
sufficient number of observations for analysis at the regional level (see Bales, 2000). As a
result, data from the second VLSS must be weighted to avoid sampling bias.
The contents of the VLSS household and commune surveys are quite
comprehensive, with over 100 pages of questions organized in 15 different sections. The
individual data used in this paper are from the sections of the household questionnaire
dealing with basic demographic characteristics, education, and labor and employment.
Household data from the sections on expenditures and assets are used as controls.
Household data are also used to assess the robustness of results, by evaluating the
relationship between sector of employment and consumption per capita. Other control
variables, such as road and waterway access, and existence of factory and cottage
industries at the local level, are from the community questionnaire. Finally, all analyses
control for geophysical region, as delta areas have certain advantages over other regions
in Vietnam, such as greater ease of transport.
Employment status and labor earnings are the two key variables for the analysis in
this paper. The VLSS collects information on primary and secondary employment for all
the working members of the household who are six years of age or older. This
information refers to occupation, sector of employment, hours worked and various
categories of compensation. Unfortunately, data on labor earnings are only available for
wageworkers, and not for the self-employed. This leads to an over-representation of the
formal sector (the salaried relationship is less prevalent in the informal sector). In this
paper, total earnings are calculated on an annual basis, using information on actual hours
of work per week and the actual weeks of work per year. Figures are annualized for those
who had worked for less than one year at the time of the survey. All earnings figures are
adjusted using price indexes that are specific to each region and month of the year.
15Three main earnings indicators are considered in the analysis. The first one is the
annual compensation received from the primary occupation, including salaries, wages,
bonuses, various supplements and payments in-kind. A second indicator is total annual
earnings, including payments in cash and in kind, from all forms of wage employment,
including primary and secondary occupation as well as other jobs held in the past 12
months. The third one is the average hourly compensation from primary occupation,
which is calculated dividing the first earnings indicator by ihe number of hours worked in
the primary occupation over the year. Finally, the section dealing with the robustness of
the results also considers a fourth indicator, which is annual consumption per capita.
The other key variable is the sector of employment. The analysis focuses on the
differences between the SOEs and the private sector, excluding government agencies.
Turnover among civil servants is low in recent years, and no substantial change in their
number is foreseen in the near future. Therefore, the relevant alternative for an SOE
worker is not a job as a civil servant,  but rather a job in the private sector. In the
empirical analysis, anyone who reported working in an SOE as his or her main
employment in the past 12 months was considered an SOE worker. Those who reported
working in a household enterprise, in a collective or cooperative enterprise, in a private
firn  or a foreign-owned company, as well as those who reported doing casual work, were
considered private sector workers. Those who reported working for the government
(including teachers, doctors and administrators), or for a mass organization, were
excluded from the sample.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the econometric
analysis, disaggregated by sector of employrnent.  The figures correspond to the 1997-98
VLSS, as this paper estimates the earnings gap for the most recent period only. The top
panel of table 2 describes the four earnings indicators considered in the paper, including
consumption per capita. These are the W variables in the analysis. It appears that SOE
workers earn almost twice as much as private sector workers, but this crude comparison
does not take into account that they also differ in other ways. The next panel report on the
observable characteristics of individuals and the households they belong to. Household
characteristics are used as controls when the earnings indicator is consumption per capita.
16The last panel contains information on the characteristics  of the communities individuals
live in. The bottom three panels of table 2 correspond to the X variables in the analysis.
6.  Model  Estimation
Four of the five econometric methods used in this paper involve the estimation of
an earnings function for private sector workers. The results are presented in Tables 3 to 6.
In terms of the methodology section above, the reported coefficients are the estimated
values of parameters ax (in Table 3), yo (in Table 4), c5s  and i5x  (in Table 5) and
'ps and px (in Table 6). The three columns in each of these tables correspond to each of
the three earnings indicators used as dependent variable in the analysis. The explanatory
variables include observable individual characteristics and community characteristics.
The fit of all these regressions is satisfactory by conventional standards. The sign and
magnitude of the estimated coefficients is consistent with results obtained in other
countries. If anything, the coefficient on the number of years of education is small by
international standards, but this is hardly surprising in a country in transition from central
planning to a market economy.
* Some of the econometric methods used in this paper involve the estimation of
other relationships, not reported in Tables 3 to 6. In particular, the switching regression
model requires the simultaneous estimation of another earnings function, for SOE
workers, and a participation model, explaining who is employed by an SOE and who
works in the private sector. The explanatory variables of the underlying participation
model include all the individual and community characteristics affecting private sector
earnings. But they also include a set of additional variables, which was identified as aj  in
the methodology section of the paper. Among these additional variables are household
characteristics (the same ones that were listed in the third panel of Table 2) and the share
of SOEs in total employment at the province level. This share was estimated based on the
1997-98 round of the VLSS, taking into account all workers, regardless of whether they
were wage earners or not.
The additional explanatory variables used to estimate the participation model are
supposed to affect the sector of employment, but not the level of earnings within each
17sector. For instance, individuals should be more likely to work in the public sector in
communities where the latter is bigger. But pay scales in the public sector should not be
affected by the share of SOEs in total employment. And pay in the private sector should
not be affected either, as it is largely determined by labor productivity. The same set of
additional variables was considered when estimating the participation equation for the
matching model.
Results based on panel data techniques involve a smaller number of observations
and, in some cases, a reduced set of explanatory  variables. In the individual effects
model, the number of observations shrinks because data on earnings in 1992-93 are not
available for all the individuals who had earnings in 1997-98. Comparisons over time can
be carried out only for those individuals whose earnings are observed twice. In the
household effects model, there are fewer observations because many households have
only one wage earner. Comparisons within households cannot be implemented in their
case.
Several reasons explain the decline in the number of explanatory variables. In the
case of the individual fixed effects model, the number of years of vocational training
received had to be dropped, because it was measured differently in the two rounds of the
VLSS. In the case of the households effects model, the restriction resulted from the
econometric technique that had to be applied. When using panel data, the choice of the
appropriate technique is determined by the Hausman test. The most efficient technique is
random effects, but it produces biased results when the explanatory variables are
correlated with the disturbance of the equation. The Hausman test indicates they are
indeed correlated in the case of the household effects model, thus requiring the use of
fixed effects. With this technique, all the variables that take the same value for all
individuals in a household (i.e., all community characteristics and regional dummies)
need to be dropped. Hence the much smaller number of explanatory variables.
For the matching model, a first step was to exclude from the sample those private
sector workers who appeared to be "too" different from SOE workers. This was achieved
by predicting the probability of being employed by an SOE for all workers, regardless of
their sector of employment. Two distribution functions were then drawn for this predicted
18probability: one for workers whose actual job was in an SOE, and another one for
workers whose actual job was in the private sector. Only the predicted probabilities
which had some density in both distributions (also called the "common support") were
retained. In practice, this amounted to discarding less than five percent of private sector
workers.
Also, in order go ensure greater uniformity an effort was made to match workers
within each geographical area. As some of the areas contained too few observations, it
was necessary to combine the northern mountains and north-central coast regions, as well
as the South Central Coast, Central Highlands and Mekong Delta regions. However, the
Red River Delta and Southeast were left separate. For each of these regional groups,
matching was done separately for rural areas, small and medium areas, and the two
biggest cities. Pairs of observations separated by a distance of 0.02 or more were
dropped. Likewise, any case which had less than 3 matches was also dropped.
7.  Predicted Earnings Gaps
The distribution of the individual earnings gaps estimated with each of the five
models is summarized in Tables 7 to 9. Each of these tables corresponds to one of the
earnings indicators considered. The bottom portion of the tables reports basic statistics on
the estimated earnings gaps, considered one at a time. The top portion reports correlation
coefficients between pairs of estimated earnings gaps. Several conclusions emerge from
these tables.
First, it appears that workers whose main occupation is in an SOE have
substantially higher annual earnings in their main job, and in all jobs, than if they had to
move to the private sector. According to tables 7 and 8, the mean earnings gap is
estimated at around 20 percent by all but one of the models that do correct for selection
bias. The exception is the individual effects model, whose mean earnings gap appears to
be twice as high. The mean earnings gap estimated without correcting for selection bias
falls in between. A similar pattern is observed regarding the median earnings gap. It
follows that a majority of SOE workers earn more than their private sector counterparts,
19given observable and unobservable characteristics.  This first conclusion is at odds with
the results obtained when using the jobs approach.
The gap in earnings in favor of SOE workers is not due to a substantially higher
remuneration per hour of work, however. Table 9 suggests that hourly earnings for the
median SOE worker are within 5 percent of what he or she could make in the private
sector. Again, estimates based on the individual effects model are the exception, as they
indicate that hourly earnings are about 20 percent higher in SOEs than in the private
sector. And estimates without correcting for the effect of selection bias fall in between.
But overall, based on Table 9 it is difficult to claim that hourly earnings in SOEs are
dramatically out of line with the private sector. The main difference is that SOE workers
get remunerated for a substantially higher number of hours, compared to their private
sector counterparts.
A third conclusion is that the earnings gaps estimated using the jobs approach is
not supported by any of the econometric models used in this paper. Based on Table 1,
private sector workers had salaries two to six times higher than those of SOE workers.
This ratio corresponds to earnings gaps (in logs) in the range of -0.7 to -1.8. According to
Table 7, fewer than 10 percent of SOE workers earn so much less than their private sector
counterparts (the earnings gap at the tenth percentile is always higher than -0.7).  In
statistical terms, these workers represent the "tail" of a distribution, and their estimated
earnings gaps are likely to reflect measurement error, rather than dismally low
remuneration in the public sector.
A fourth, important conclusion refers to the consistency of the aggregate results
obtained with the different econometric models used in this paper. This consistency is
highlighted by Figures 1 to 3, which reproduce the distribution of the earnings gaps
estimated with all five models. Each of these figures corresponds to one of the three
earnings indicators considered. The figures were drawn using an Epanechnikov kernel
density function with fifty intervals. Figures 1 to 3 display a similar distribution of
earnings gaps, regardless of the econometric technique used.
Last but not least, the results obtained with different econometric models are also
consistent at the individual level. In principle, the distribution of the earnings gap could
20be similar with all five models, but the place occupied by different SOE workers in these
distributions could be dramatically  different. For instance, a specific SOE worker could
appear to be generously overpaid when using one model, and dismally underpaid when
using a different one. The top portions of Tables 7 to 9 show that this is not the case. The
correlation coefficient between individual earnings gaps estimated with any two models
is always high. It exceeds 0.7 in more than half of the cases.
8.  Robustness
The eamings gaps estimated in this paper are presumably robust, in the sense that
five different econometric models and three different earnings variables were used in the
process, all leading to relatively similar conclusions. However, criticism could be made
that these estimates are flawed, as they are all based on self-reported earnings. The under-
declaration of earnings is a common bias of household surveys like the VLSS. This bias
provides a strong rationale to use the jobs approach when estimating the earnings gap
between the public and the private sector. The jobs approach rests on earnings data
collected from establishments, hence much less subject to measurement error. Imagine,
for instance, that workers systematically  report a third of their earnings. In that case,
salaries in the "best" companies in Vietnam would be only twice as high as SOE salaries,
and not six times higher as Table 1 suggested.
While this criticism is potentially valid, it does not appear to be highly relevant in
the case of Vietnam. Based on the VLSS, in 1998 the average annual compensation of an
SOE worker in his or her occupation was 8,728 thousand dong. On the other hand, an
enterprise survey carried out in 2000 reported an average compensation of 10,270
thousand dong per SOE worker (Belser and Rama, 2001, Table 2). This latter figure
being based on firm-level records, it is similar in nature to the information the jobs
approach would use. But is it really higher than the one resulting from the VLSS?
Between 1998 and 2000 the Vietnamese economy grew at an average rate of roughly five
percent per year. If the growth rates of salaries were similar, 8,728 thousand dong in 1998
would become 9,623 thousand dong in 2000. Moreover, the enterprises considered in the
above-mentioned survey were large, and it is common for large enterprises to pay higher
21wages. Taking into account wage inflation and this size bias, SOE wages do not appear to
be under-estimated by the VLSS.
A related concern has to do with the different extent of under-reporting in the
public and the private sectors of the economy. Maybe SOE salaries are not under-
reported, but the more variable and less well documented earnings of private sector
workers are. Systematic under-reporting of private sector earnings would lead to
overestimate the earnings gap, and possibly support the conclusion that SOE workers are
overpaid, even when this were not true.
One way to address this concern is to estimate consumption gaps, instead of
earnings gaps. Surveys like the VLSS have a very detailed consumption module.
Respondents are asked in great detail about which items they purchase, how frequently,
and at which cost. Such a detailed measurement of consumption is deemed necessary for
poverty assessments. But in the present context it can be used to verify whether SOE
workers have a higher level of consumption per capita than their private sector
counterparts (as the results in the previous sections show) or a lower level (as the jobs
approach suggests).
All but one of the econometric models were therefore re-estimated using
consumption per capita, instead of eamings, as the dependent variable. The consumption
figures were constructed by adding up rice, other food, non-food expenditures (including
health and education), depreciation of durable goods and the rental price of housing,
using a methodology that is standard in poverty assessments. These values were deflated
by rice, other food, and non-food prices, for each region and each month of the year. The
resulting total was divided by household size. Because consumption per capita is affected
by the size and age composition of a household, as well as by its accumulated assets,
additional explanatory variables were needed when re-estimating the models. Those
variables are the ones listed in the third data panel in Table 2. Household effects is the
one model that could not be re-estimated. This is because, by construction, all of the adult
members of a household have the same consumption level. In the absence of variation in
the dependent variable within the household, differences in the observable characteristics
22of its members (including the sector they work in) would appear to have no
consequences.
The estimated consumption gaps are summarized in Table 10. It appears that the
consumption per capita of SOE workers would decline by roughly twenty percent if they
were to move to the private sector. Only one model (the last one) yields a smaller gap,
but it still shows that most SOE workers would be worse off if they had to relinquish
their jobs. As before, the correlation between gaps estimated with any two models is
high.
9.  Conclusion
The workers approach provides reliable estimates of the earnings gap between
public and private sector jobs, even in a country where recruitment into the public sector,
and separations from it, are strongly influenced by individual characteristics that are not
observable. All of the estimates of the average earnings gap fall within a relatively
narrow range, regardless of the model used. The overall distribution of earnings gaps at
the individual level is similar in all cases. And individual earnings gaps estimated with
any two models are highly correlated. Based on the results obtained, SOE workers would
earn similar or slightly lower hourly wages in the private sector, but their total earnings
would fall by more than 20 percent. It is thus safe to conclude that SOE workers are
overpaid, not underpaid, in Vietnam.
If anything, the results in this paper underestimate the extent to which SOE
workers are overpaid, because it focuses on measurable earnings and benefits only. Some
of the most valuable benefits associated with public sector  jobs are very difficult to
quantify. They include higher  job security, a more generous old-age pension regime,
more flexibility, and lower effort levels, among others. None of these benefits was
included in the earnings variables used in the analysis. In developing countries, only the
"best" private sector  jobs offer similar benefits. If SOE workers were to move to the
private sector, they would therefore experience a larger loss than measured by the
earnings gap only. Studies done for other countries estimate the value of the loss in
23intangible benefits at 20 to 50 percent of the SOE salary (see Assaad, 1999, and Chong
and Rama, 2001).
The conclusion that SOE workers are substantially overpaid is at odds with the
one obtained when using the jobs approach. The latter suggested that SOE workers could
earn salaries two to six times higher in the private sector. Admittedly, one could argue
about the most accurate econometric model to estimate the earnings gap when using the
workers approach. It is also regrettable that some of the estimates of the average earnings
gap differ by as much as twenty percentage points. But the range of variation resulting
from the workers approach, depending on the model used, is negligible compared to the
magnitude of the mistakes the jobs approach would lead to. Governments, and
multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, would be ill-advised to recommend
pay raises in the public sector based on the jobs approach. The results in this paper show
that even a crude version of the workers approach, not correcting the estimated earnings
gaps for selection bias, would yield more reliable results.
Of course, it would be inappropriate to conclude that public sector workers are
always overpaid. The results in this paper refer to a specific group of public sector
workers in a specific country at a specific point in time. The results may not even apply
to government employees in Vietnam. In fact, the most important message of this paper
refers to the methodology it proposes, not to the results it obtains. This methodology
could be easily replicated for other public sector workers, especially in the context of
public sector reform. In the case of Vietnam, government administration will be subject
to an ambitious reform program over the next ten years. According to this program,
"fundamental reforms will be undertaken with regard to the salary of cadres and civil
servants, so that these will become the main driving force for the public administration
system and be adequate to maintain their life and the life of their families" (Government
of Vietnam, 2001, p. 10, official translation). Basing those fundamental reforms on the
workers approach, rather than the jobs approach, would be advisable.
In finishing, it is worth making one last point on methodology. All of the models
used in this paper are based on a hypothetical comparison of earnings in and out of the
public sector. Experimentation would be a much more reliable method to estimate the
24earnings gap. If SOE workers could be fired, their subsequent earnings would provide an
unbiased measure of the extent to which they were underpaid or overpaid in the public
sector. Needless to say, running such an experiment  would be inadmissible on moral
grounds. But the reform program of Vietnam, aimed at modernizing the state sector, will
mimic it in practice.
Over the next few years several hundred thousand SOE workers may lose their
jobs as their enterprises change ownership, are restructured or go bankrupt. Most of the
job separations will be voluntary, but for some workers there will be no choice (for
instance, in the context of liquidation). Earnings gaps estimated along the lines proposed
in this paper have been used to design an appropriate compensation  package (World
Bank, 2001). It is precisely because SOE workers are overpaid that the package needs to
be generous. Indeed, there would be no need for compensation if separated workers could
earn two to six times higher salaries after separation, as the jobs approach indicates. But
information on the exact extent of the subsequent loss in earnings can be used to fine-
tune the compensation package. And this information can also be used to assess which of
the five models considered in this paper produced more accurate (or less inaccurate)
predictions. Such an assessment is the natural follow up of this research.
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27Table 1. Salaries Based on Jobs Approach
Data from
household survey  Data from  "best" employers
Private  Private sector workers
SOE  sector
Job description  workers  workers  At entry level  At mid- career
Cleaners  14,346  n.a.  37,764  44,028
Guards  7,904  14,661  n.a.  n.a.
Drivers  10,670  15,391  n.a.  n.a.
Office workers  10,420  23,623  53,436  62,364
Source:  All figures  are in thousand  dong, at 1998  prices.  The first two data columns  report authors' calculations
based  on data from the 1997-98  VLSS.  The  private  sector  jobs considered  in the second  data column  are for workers
who have  a written  contract  in enterprises  with a personnel  of 10 or more. The figures  in the last two columns  are
from an unpublished  salary review commnissioned  by the Vietnam  office of the United Nations Development
Program  (UNDP)  in 2000.  They  are adjusted  to 1998  prices  based  on the variation  of the exchange  rate  index.
Table 2. Descriptive  Statistics
SOE workers  Private sector workers
St.  St.
Variable  Mean  Median  dev.  Mean  Median  dev.
Annual compensation in all jobs  8,970  6,729  9,342  5,494  4,357  5,111
Annual compensation in main job  8,728  6,534  9,198  5,305  4,218  4,996
Hourly compensation in main job  3.86  2.89  3.97  2.91  2.33  2.67
Annual per capita consumption  5,061  4,318  3,395  2,935  2,224  2,539
Schooling (years)  10.52  12.00  3.42  6.80  7.00  3.75
Vocational training (years)  0.69  0.00  1.21  0.14  0.00  0.59
Work experience (years)  17.2  17.0  9.9  17.3  14.0  12.1
Male (yes = 1)  0.56  1.00  0.50  0.63  1.00  0.48
Religion (anyreligion=  1)  0.21  0.00  0.41  0.37  0.00  0.48
Kinh or Chinese (yes = 1)  0.99  1.00  0.10  0.93  1.00  0.26
Single (yes = 1)  0.33  0.00  0.47  0.49  0.00  0.50
Household head (yes = 1)  0.30  0.00  0.46  0.27  0.00  0.44
Lives in a small town (yes = 1)  0.18  0.00  0.38  0.13  0.00  0.33
Lives in a medium town (yes = 1)  0.25  0.00  0.43  0.09  0.00  0.29
Lives in a major city (yes  1)  0.27  0.00  0.44  0.20  0.00  0.40
Lives in a delta area (yes  1)  0.81  1.00  0.39  0.76  1.00  0.43
Household size  5.15  5.00  2.16  5.57  5.00  2.12
Share of children in household (%)  23.5  22.2  19.4  24.9  25.0  20.8
Share of elderly in household (%)  8.53  0.00  14.6  8.50  0.00  14.6
Agricultural land (square meters)  0.13  0.00  0.49  0.20  0.00  0.51
Road in community (yes = 1)  0.97  1.00  .0.16  0.85  1.00  0.36
Cottage industry in community (yes =1)  0.68  1.00  0.47  0.64  1.00  0.48
Factory in community (yes = 1)  0.91  1.00  0.29  0.70  1.00  0.46
Number of observations  566  1,970
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on data  from the 1997-98  VLSS.  All monetary  figures  are in thousand  dong.
28Table 3. Estimates without Correcting for Selection Bias
The dependent variable is the log of
Hourly
Annual earnings in  Annual earnings in  earnings in
Explanatory variables  main job  alljobs  mainjob
Schooling (years)  0.0405 ***  0.0411 ***  0.0428 *
(6.677)  (6.455)  (8.437)
Vocational training (years)  -0.0007  0.0004  -0.0010
(-0.023)  (0.012)  (-0.032)
Work experience (years)  0.0205 ***  0.0210 ***  0.0142 ***
(3.700)  (3.614)  (3.362)
Work experience squared  -0.0005 ***  -0.0005 ***  -0.0003 *
(-5.165)  (-5.231)  (-4.144)
Male (yes = 1)  0.3010 ***  0.3111 ***  0.2768 *
(7.788)  (7.960)  (8.865)
Religion (any religion = 1)  -0.0980 *  -0.0942 *  -0.0434
(-1.715)  (-1.755)  (-1.211)
Kinh or Chinese (yes = 1)  0.0230  0.0525  0.0441
(0.279)  (0.619)  (0.864)
Single (yes=  1)  -0.0812 *  -0.0878 *  -0.0724 **
(-1.767)  (-1.893)  (-1.985)
Household head (yes = 1)  -0.0138  -0.0152  -0.0432
(-0.307)  (-0.329)  (-1.183)
Lives in a small town (yes = 1)  -0.0851  -0.0910  -0.0879 *
(-1.168)  (-1.277)  (-1.753)
Lives in a medium town (yes = 1)  0.0950  0.0890  0.0559
(1.016)  (0.999)  (0.841)
Lives in a major city (yes =1)  0.4351 ***  0.4101 ***  0.2736***
(4.390)  (4.257)  (3.455)
Lives in a delta area (yes  1)  0.0501  0.0384  0.0453
(0.787)  (0.618)  (0.969)
Road in community (yes =  1)  0.2062 **  0.1716 *  -0.0154
(2.190)  (1.855)  (-0.299)
Cottage industry in community (yes =1)  -0.0484  -0.0444  -0.0543
(-0.740)  (-0.694)  (-1.210)
Factory in community (yes = 1)  0.0529  0.0437  -0.0118
(0.719)  (0.583)  (-0.279)
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes
R2  0.278  0.274  0.250
F-test  17.84  17.93  17.82
Number of observations  1,970  1,970  1,970
Source:  Authors' calculations.  Refers  to workers  in the private sector only. Estimated  on data from the 1997-98
VLSS,  using ordinary  least squares  weighted  by sampling  cluster.  Values  in parenthesis  are t-statistics.  Significant
coefficients  at the 10,  5 and 1 percent  levels  are indicated  by one,  two and  three asterisks,  respectively.
29Table  4. Estimates  using the Switching  Regression  Model
The dependent variable is the log of
Annual earnings  Annual earnings  Hourly earnings
Explanatory variables  in main  job  in all  jobs  in main  job
Schooling (years)  0.0323 ***  0.0328 ***  0.0373
(4.547)  (4.689)  (7.032)
Vocational training (years)  -0.0275  -0.0267  -0.0191
(-0.922)  (-0.887)  (-0.981)
Work experience (years)  0.0184 ***  0.0189 ***  0.0128 ***
(3.905)  (4.003)  (3.316)
Work experience squared  -0.0005 ***  -0.0005 ***  -0.0002
(-6.207)  (-6.542)  (-3.820)
Male (yes = 1)  0.3200 ***  0.3302 *  0.2895 ***
(9.012)  (9.382)  (10.298)
Religion (any religion=  1)  -0.0895 **  -0.0855 **  -0.0374
(-2.464)  (-2.327)  (-1.289)
Kinh or Chinese (yes = 1)  0.0190  0.0482  0.0417
(0.248)  (0.624)  (0.623)
Single (yes = 1)  -0.0735  -0.0802  -0.0676 *
(-1.485)  (-1.585)  (-1.714)
Household head (yes = 1)  -0.0005  -0.0015  -0.0345
(-0.010)  (-0.031)  (-0.928)
Lives in a small town (yes = 1)  -0.0974 *  -0.1032 *  -0.0958 **
(-1.716)  (-1.775)  (-2.130)
Lives in a medium town (yes = 1)  0.0541  0.0477  0.0290
(0.769)  . (0.681)  (0.557)
Lives in a major city (yes  1)  0.4334 ***  0.4084 ***  0.2728 ***
(7.298)  (6.837)  (5.880)
Lives in a delta area (yes =  1)  0.0453  0.0339  0.0423
(0.998)  (0.740)  (1.182)
Road in community (yes=  1)  0.1951  ***  0.1605  ***  -0.0229
(3.629)  (3.013)  (-0.446)
Cottage industry in community (yes =1)  -0.0269  -0.0227  -0.0403
(-0.668)  (-0.564)  (-1.204)
Factory in community (yes = 1)  0.0345  0.0251  -0.0243
(0.791)  (0.574)  (-0.657)
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes
Correlation po between ij1  and °o 0 -0.6097 ***  -0.6287 ***  -0.5754 ***
Correlation ps between Tli  and mosi  0.2950 **  0.2977  0.2560 *
Log of likelihood function  -3447.8  -3451.3  -2893.0
Number of observations  2,536  2,536  2,536
Source:  Authors' calculations.  Reported  coefficients  refer to workers  in the private  sector only. Estimated  on data
from the 1997-98  VLSS, using full-information  maximum  likelihood  weighted by sampling cluster. Values in
parenthesis  are t-statistics.  Significant  coefficients  at the 10, 5 and 1 percent  levels  are indicated  by one, two and
three asterisks,  respectively.
30Table 5. Estimates using Individual-Speciflc Random Effects
The depnent  variable is th  log of
Annual earnings  Annual earnings  Hourly earnings
Explanatory variables  in main  job  in all jobs  in main job
Main job is in an SOE (yes  1)  0.4397 ***  0.4207 ***  0.2147
(7.420)  (7.143)  (4.690)
Schooling (years)  0.0286 ***  0.0331 ***  0.0270
(3.484)  (4.060)  (4.250)
Work experience (years)  0.0515 ***  0.0511 ***  0.0391
(6.431)  (6.418)  (6.308)
Work experience squared  -0.0010 ***  -0.0010 *  -0.0007
(-7.049)  (-7.124)  (-6.285)
Male (yes = 1)  0.3308 ***  0.3502 ***  0.2656
(6.396)  (6.823)  (6.635)
Religion (any religion = 1)  -0.0885 *  -0.0847 *  -0.0728
(-1.792)  (-1.724)  (-1.912)
Kinh or Chinese (yes = 1)  0.1259  0.1358  0.0500
(1.164)  (1.263)  (0.598)
Single (yes = 1)  0.0037  -0.0071  -0.0438
(0.054)  (-0.103)  (-0.819)
Household head (yes = 1)  0.0148  -0.0031  -0.0409
(0.246)  (-0.052)  (-0.880)
Lives in a small town (yes = 1)  0.0552  0.0427  0.1096
(0.701)  (0.546)  (1.796)
Lives in a medium town (yes = 1)  0.1211  0.0966  0.0421
(1.418)  (1.140)  (0.638)
Lives in a major city (yes=  1)  0.3896 ***  0.3789 ***  0.2518
(4.764)  (4.666)  (3.978)
Lives in a delta area (yes  1)  0.0281  0.0091  0.0660
(0.442)  (0.143)  (1.340)
Road in community (yes  1)  0.0746  0.1016  -0.1041
(0.887)  (1.215)  (-1.603)
Cottage industry in community (yes =1)  0.0721  0.1074 *  0.0538
(1.231)  (1.844)  (1.191)
Factory in community (yes  1)  0.1262 **  0.1081 *  0.0291
(2.064)  (1.776)  (0.618)
Year 1998 (yes  1)  0.4402 ***  0.4552***  0.4188
(10.428)  (10.827)  (12.882)
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes
Overall R2 0.396  0.402  0.400
Wald X 2 641.63  657.22  663.09
Hausman test  19.87  17.55  11.43
Number of observations  1,084  1084  1,084
Source:  Authors' calculations.  Refers  to all workers  who had eamings  in 1992-93  and 1997-98.  Estimnated  on panel
data from the VLSS,  using  random  effects  at the individual  level.  Values  in parenthesis  are t-statistics.  Significant
coefficients  at the 10,  5 and 1  percent  levels  are indicated  by one,  two and  three asterisks,  respectively.
3'Table 6. Estimates using Household-Specific Fixed Effects
The de  endent variable is the log of
Annual earnings in  Annual earnings in  Hourly earnings in
Explanatory variables  main  job  all  jobs  main job
Main job is in an SOE (yes =1)  0.2078***  0.2310***  0.0355
(2.945)  (3.164)  (0.691)
Schooling  (years)  0.0228  ***  0.0260 ***  0.0275  *
(2.788)  (3.062)  (4.617)
Vocational training (years)  -0.0266  -0.0128  -0.0336
(-0.833)  (-0.385)  (-1.442)
Work  experience  (years)  0.0397  ***  0.0406  ***  0.0295  ***
(6.748)  (6.681)  (6.898)
Work  experience  squared  -0.0008  ***  -0.0008  ***  -0.0005  ***
(-7.862)  (-7.913)  (-6.261)
Male (yes = 1)  0.2432***  0.2800***  0.2250***
(7.178)  (7.987)  (9.128)
Single (yes = 1)  -0.0450  -0.0512  -0.0122
(-0.717)  (-0.790)  (-0.268)
Household  head (yes  =  1)  0.1114  **  0.0889  0.0323
(2.126)  (1.635)  (0.848)
Regional dummies  No  No  No
Overall R2 0.160  0.176  0.141
F-test  24.01  25.98  29.24
Hausman test  30.47  28.66  35.03
Number of observations  1,549  1,549  1,549
Source: Authors' calculations.  Refers  to all workers  in households  with  at least  two wage  earners.  Estimated  on data
from the 1997-98  VLSS,  using  fixed  effects  at the household  level.  Values  in parenthesis  are t-statistics.  Significant
coefficients  at the 10,  5 and I percent  levels  are indicated  by one,  two and  three  asterisks,  respectively.
Table 7. Summary Statistics for Gap in Annual Earnings in Main Job
_  Gap between SOEs and pr  ivate  sector
RI  R2  R3  R4  R5
RI  1.0000  0.9852  0.8854  0.5563  0.7420
R2  1.00000  0.8541  0.5685  0.7295
R3  1.0000  0.3677  0.6597
R4  1.0000  0.4407
R5  1.0000
Mean  0.3269  0.1828  0.4431  0.2078  0.1714
Median  0.3198  0.1736  0.4176  0.2195  0.1907
Standard  deviation  1  0.5687  0.5664  0.3754  0.3662  0.7299
10th  %  -0.3203  -0.4620  0.0201  -0.2363  -0.6912
25th  0  |  0.0048  -0.1500  0.2074  0.0346  -0.2724
75th %  0.6849  0.5233  0.6814  0.3767  0.6294
90til%  %/  0.9929  0.8264  0.8830  0.6561  0.9982
Observations  566  566  143  317  368
Source: Authors' calculations.
32Table 8. Summary Statistics for Gap in Annual Earnings in All Jobs
Gap between SOEs and private sector
_RI  R2  R3  R4  R5
Rl  1.0000  0.9836  0.8866  0.5726  0.7379
R2  1.0000  0.8521  0.5829  0.7241
R3  1.0000  0.4207  0.6496
R4  1.0000  0.4405
R5  1.0000
Mean  0.3271  0.1748  0.4200  0.2310  0.1675
Median  0.3109  0.1820  0.4026  0.2403  0.1973
Standard deviation  0.5635  0.5629  0.3738  0.3711  0.7291
1oth %  -0.3364  -0.5023  -0.0046  -0.2019  -0.6377
2 5th %  -0.0118  -0.1591  0.1795  0.0406  -0.2631
75th %  0.6735  0.5151  0.6631  0.4213  0.5829
goth %  0.9753  0.8280  0.8628  0.6858  1.0292
Observations  566  566  143  317  368
Source: Authors'  calculations.
Table 9. Summary Statistics for Gap in Hourly Earnings in Main Job
Gap between SOEs and private sector
RI  R2  R3  R4  R5
Rl  1.0000  0.9830  0.8887  0.5374  0.7292
R2  1.0000  0.8533  0.5525  0.7256
R3  1.0000  0.4910  0.4656
R4  1.0000  0.5186
R5  1.0000
Mean  0.0996  -0.0605  0.1906  0.0355  -0.0467
Median  0.0942  -0.0616  0.2181  0.0453  -0.0577
Standard deviation  0.5357  0.5308  0.3363  0.3403  0.7356
loth %  -0.5482  -0.7070  -0.2149  -0.4042  -0.9087
25th  %  -0.2239  -0.3889  -0.0502  -0.1279  -0.4708
75th %  0.4045  0.2522  0.4002  0.2247  0.4276
90th %  0.7288  0.5362  0.5701  0.4578  0.8532
Observations  566  566  143  317  368
Source: Authors' calculations.
33Table 10. Summary Statistics for Gap in Consumption per Capita
Gap between SOEs and private sector
RI  R2  R3  R4  R5
RI  1.0000  0.9957  0.6940  n.a.  0.7077
R2  1.0000  0.6825  n.a.  0.7178
R3  1.0000  n.a.  0.5440
R4  1.0000  n.a.
R5  1.0000
Mean  0.2140  0.1880  0.2490  n.a.  0.0753
Median  0.2052  0.1699  0.2404  n.a.  0.0643
Standard deviation  0.4259  0.4284  0.2305  n.a.  0.5611
lotl  %  -0.3052  -0.3494  -0.0320  n.a.  -0.5938
25th %  -0.0642  -0.0747  0.0536  n.a.  -0.3215
75th %  0.4704  0.4487  0.4094  n.a.  0.4323
goth %  0.7607  0.7179  0.5515  n.a.  0.7203
Observations  566  566  143  0  368
Source: Authors' calculations.
34Figure 1. The Distribution of the Gap in Annual Earnings in Main Job
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35Figure 2. The Distribution of the Gap in Annual Earnings in All Jobs
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36Figure 3. The Distribution  of the Gap in Hourly  Earnings  in Main Job
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